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IN THE SUPREME COURT
oF· THE

STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN, also known
as BILL CHRISTENSEN and CELESTE
CHRISTENSEN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Civil
No. 8966

EMERON CHRISTENSEN and KATHLEEN
CHRISTENSEN, husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
This action was brought by the plaintiffs William Christensen and his wife, Celeste Christensen against Emeron
Christensen and his wife, Kathleen Christensen, defendantsappellants herein, to require the specific performance of two
alleged oral contracts as hereinafter stated. The defendantsappellants answered denying the existence of such contracts
8,nd set up the statute of frauds and statute of limitations
as defenses thereto.
The matter was tried before the Court at Richfield,
Sevier County, Utah, on October 21 and 22, 1957, and the
Court after taking the matter under advisement, entered its
Decision on May 29, 1958, £or the plaintiffs and against the
defendants and subsequently denied defendants' Motion for
New Trial.
It is from this decision that the defendants now appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Complaint was first brought by the plaintiff, William
Christensen on Sept. 7, 1956 against the defendant Emeron
Christensen, alleging that during the year 1942 the defendant, Emeron Christensen sold two tracts of real property
in Sevier County, Utah, one tract containing 8 acres and one
tract containing 2 acres, to the plaintiff for the sum of
$1000.00 to be paid upon an installment basis (no definite
time being set up in the complaint for such payments) and
without interest, such payments to be made in the form of
credits against the purchase price for services to be rendered
by the plaintiff to the defendant and for certain livestock
to be furnished defendant by plaintiff, and that to the date
of the filing of the complaint services and livestock had been
furnished to the extent of $684.00, and that plaintiff owed a
balance of $316.00 which he was ready and willing to pay.
The complaint further alleged that the plaintiff went into
possession of this property in 1942 and that he and his
lessees were in possession of same up to and including the
crop year of 1955 and that beginning with the crop year of
1956 he was dispossessed by the defendant. And further
alleged that during his occupancy he improved the ground
by fertilizing, leveling, and repairing fences. (R A-1)
The defendant answered the complaint and denied the
existence of the contract and set up that although the alleged contract was for the sale of lands, no note or memorandum thereof was ever made in writing expressing the
consideration and terms, subscribed by the defendant or any
authorized agent of the defendant, and that the alleged contract was not performed within one year from the date of
the alleged making and is void by reason of the Statute of
Frauds. (R A-23)
2
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Thereafter the matter was set for trial to begin on
March 22, 1957 at 10 A.M. (R A-26) but was thereafter postponed and on April 2, 1957, counsel for plaintiff filed a motjon to amend the complaint and f.or joinder of additional
party defendant and party plaintiff which was granted by
the court (R A-28) and an Amended Complaint was thereupon filed joining Celeste Christensen, the wife of plaintiff,
as a party plaintiff, and Kathleen Christensen, the wife of
defendant, as a party defendant. The Amended Complaint
set up a Second Cause of Action in which it was alleged that
during the year 1942 the plaintiffs and defendants entered
into another oral agreement whereby it was agreed that the
plaintiffs would convey to defendants 35 acres of real property they owned in Sevier County, Utah, with 171;2 shares
of Elsinore Irrigation Canal Company water, in consideration
for the conveyance by Defendants~ to Plaintiff Celeste Christensen of 15 acres of real property in Sevier County, Utah,
owned by defendant Kathleen Christensen, plus 221j2 shares
of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company water stock, and as a
further consideration to the deal the defendants agreed to
assume and discharge a certain financial obligation then
owed by the plaintiffs to the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley.
The plaintiffs then allege that all of the contract had been
performed save and except the defendants had failed and
refused to transfer and deliver to plaintiffs the 22112 shares
of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company water stock. (R A-37)
Defendants answered the First Cause of Action of the
Amended Complaint denying they had ever entered into such
oral contract and again setting up the statute of frauds, and
entered a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, which motion was overruled by the court. (R A-49)
(R A-53) The defendants then answered the Second Cause
3
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of Action denying they had ever agreed to such transaction
so far as the transfer of 22V2 shares of Sevier Valley Irrigation Water stock was concerned, and further setting up that
this cause of action was barred by reason of the statute of
limitations. (R A-54)
The testimony as to the contracts claimed by the plaintiffs and the denial thereof by the defendants is as follows:
The plaintiff, William Christensen, testified in substance as follows:
In the spring of the year 1942 he had a conversation with the defendant Emeron Cbx\stensen which
took place in the plaintiff's stack yarJ and he and the
defendant were the only persons present and at that
time the defendant offered to trade land. The plaintiff then said if the defendant would give him clear
title on his home, 15 acres of farming ground, and
221f2 shares of Sevier Valley Water, he would give
the defendant 35 acres of land and 17¥2 shares of
Elsinore water. (R 15-18) And at that time the defendant said he would sell his 10 acre tract (the 8
and 2 acre tract as described in the First Cause of
Action) to the plaintiff for $1000.00 ($100.00 per
acre) but this transaction was not a part of the other
transaction involving the trading of lands· and water.
(R 15 to 18) The defendant told him he could pay
as they went along and haul his beet pulp to the
sugar factory and deliver livestock. That two or
three days after the date this conversation took place
the plaintiff took defendant a bay mare and in the
fall of 1942 he delivered other animals to the defendant and that his wife kept track of these transactions in a note book. That he hauled 255 tons of beet
pulp for defendant at $1.50 per ton in the fall of 1943
and spring of 1944. (R 19 to 28)
Then in June of 1942 the defendant and his· wife
called at the home of plaintiff in Richfield, Utah,
when they brought the plaintiffs the deed to their
home released by the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley,
the deed to the 15 acre tract and abstracts on the 10
acre tract, and the defendants then received from

4
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plaintiffs the deed to the 34 acre tract and 171;2
shares of water in the Elsinore Canal Company and
that plaintiff asked the defendant Emeron Christensen when he was going to get the deeds on the 8 and
2 acre tracts and defendant answered 'You have got
it just about paid for. I'll fix it all up with you, your
water stock and your deeds and you can finish paying me for it.' (R 29 to 31)
That in the spring ·of 1943 he had another conversation with the defendant, Emeron Christensen
at his farm and that the defendant Emeron Christensen said he had been too busy to get things fixed
but would do so right away. (R 32)
That he had another ·conversation with defendant before 1950 at his home in Richfield when the
defendants called to get plaintiff to transfer a cattle
permit he was holding for defendant and when asked
when he was going to fix up plaintiffs' property, defendant said 'Any time.' " (R 34)
The defendant, Emeron Christensen testified in substance as follows :
"That he never had any oral agreement with
plaintiff for the sale of the 8 and 2 acre tracts and
never agreed to sell him that property for $100.00
per acre. That he heard plaintiff testify he was to
buy that property and work it out, sell livestock and
apply it and have all the time he wanted without
interest. Defendant denied that this was the truth.
(R 119) Defendant said the arrangement he did
have with the plaintiff was this: Plaintiffs had their
home, 111;2 shares of water stock in Sevier Valley
Canal Co. and their farm mortgaged to Federal Land
Bank of Berkeley. Defendant agreed to pay off the
balance on the mortgage in the sum of some $2300.00
which would release plaintiffs' home, their water
stock and farm, and deed plaintiff a 15 acre tract of
farming ground which could be watered under the
Sevier Valley canal and on which plaintiff could use
his 111;2 shares of Sevier Valley water, in consideration for the plaintiffs deeding to defendants a 34
acre tract with 171;2 shares Elsinore Canal Water.
That this completed the transaction and there was

5
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never any agreement on defendants' part to further
transfer to plaintiffs 221f2 shares of Sevier Valley
water. (R 127 - 128)
With regard to the 8 and 2 acre tracts, defendant let the plaintiff farm this during the years 1942
to 1955 with the use of such water of defendants as
plaintiff helped himself to. Water was never turned
to defendant but he us~ed such water of defendant's
stream as he needed. He did this to help plaintiff
out and let him have the land for the payment -of th2
taxes thereon. That a reasonable rental value for
the land would be about $40.00 per acre. That the
value of the land in 1942 would have been in excess
of $100.00 per acre, and that defendant had bought a
like amount of land 1f2 mile south of this tract at
that time for $3000.00. He said the plaintiff had
never asked him to convey the 8 and 2 acre tracts as
it was understood he was just farming it. He denied receiving the livestock as testified to by plaintiffs, and denied the plaintiffs having any credit by
reason of hauling pulp, potatoes or coal, for which
he had not been paid. (R 120 to 136)
That during all of this time plaintiffs never paid
any of the water assessments on the 221f2 shares of
Sevier Valley water stock they now claim, but all of
such assessments were paid by the defendant." (R
121 - 122)
As to the improvements placed on the property during
the years plaintiff farmed it, the plaintiff testified:
That in 1943 and 44 he manured the ground
(R 49) That in the fall of 1945 and spring of 1946
he had the land leveled at a cost of $300.00 which he
paid the Otter Creek Reservoir Co. under a cooperative plan which included his 15 acre tract also. (R 5152) He also paid the County $85.00 on a touch up
j.ob that year (R 53). He repaired the fences to the
extent of replacing 1f2 dozen posts and new wiring
the cost of which he didn't say. (R 54) He worked
three weeks on improving a County Road to the property in 1943 or 44. (R 54 - 55)
As to the improvements, on the land in question the defendant testified:
6
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That the ground at present time has to be leveled-that it is almost impossible to irrigate. That
the fences are like they always have been, posts
sticking up here and there and loose wire. (R 126)
That the County Road plaintiff testified he worked
on runs for about a mile and serves plaintiff's other
piece of ground as well as the ground in dispute, and
land belonging to others and it is a County Road and
not on the property in dispute. (R 129 - 130)
After the trial of the action was concluded in October of
1957, the Court took the matter under advisement and in
April of 1958 called counsel for plaintiffs and for the defendants to his office and stated he wished to obtain some additional facts before rendering a decision. It was the understanding of counsel for defendants that any such additional
facts· to be submitted would be submitted by a stipulation by
counsel for all of the parties. On May 14, 1958, a letter was
written to the Court by counsel for the plaintiffs (R 173 - 4)
in which a detailed statement of principal and interest on
the Federal Land Bank loan of plaintiffs was set forth purporting to be information received from the Federal Land
Bank of Berkeley, and further submitting valuations on land
and water rights involved in this action..:.
Counsel for defendants took exception to such letter and
procedure and wrote the Court on May 20, 1958 (R 175) to
the effect that any evidential information to be submitted
should be submitted by stipulation between counsel and made
a part of the record.
Notwithstanding this objection another letter was written to the Court on May 23, 1958 (R 176) by counsel for
plaintiffs with further estimates and valuations.
And the Court thereafter on May 29, 1958, entered his
decision in this matter. (R 155- 6)

7
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE
EVIDENCE.
(a) Evidence was Insufficient to Prove the Existence of
a Contract on Either Cause of Action.
(b) If Contract on First Cause of Action Existed Terms
were too Uncertain to Entitle Specific Performance.
(c) If Contract on First Cause of Action Existed It was
Within the.Statute of Frauds.
(d) Second Cause of Action was Barred by Statute of
Limitations and Statute of Frauds.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REQUESTING AND RECEIVING FROM PLAINTIFFS'
COUNSEL, LETTERS AND STATEMENTS OF EVIDENCE AFTER THE TRIAL OF THIS ACTION, AND
OBJECTED TO BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS.
Ill. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
ARGUMENT
THAT THE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO
LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
(a) Evidence was Insufficient to Prove the Existence
of a Contract on Either Cause of Action.
The law is well settled that before specific performance
can be decreed the existence of the contract must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence and that a greater
amount or degree of certainty is required in the terms of an
agreement which is to be specifically executed in equity, than
is necessary in a contract which is to be the basis of an action at law for damages. 1
POINT I.

1 See Pomroy's Specific Performance of Contracts, 2nd Ed. No.
159 and also as quoted in Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275, 30 P. 2nd,
853, and also in Mestas v. Martini, 113 Colo. 108, 155 P. 2nd 161.

8
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Our Utah Court has held that there can be no contract
unless the minds of the parties have met and have mutually
agreed. This was true in the case of Montgomery v. Berrett,
40 Utah 385, 121 P. 569 wherein it was held:
"Plaintiff seeking the specific performance of
a parole contract must establish the terms thereof
with a greater degree of certainty than is required
in an action at law, and he must show a clear, mutual understanding and a positive assent of both parties to the terms of the contract."
and Justice Frick states at page 570 of the Pacific report:
"(1) It is now well settled that, where a party
seeks specific performance of a parol contract in
equity, he must establish the terms thereof with a
greater degree of certainty than would be required
to establish the same contract in an action at law.
Pomeroy on Conts. (2d Ed) No. 159. Referring to
this question, the Supreme Court of California, in a
recent case, entiled German Svgs. & Loan Soc. v. Me
LeHan, 1954 Cal. at page 716, 99 P. at page 196,
states the rule in the following language: 'There can
be no contract, unless the minds of the parties have
met and have mutually agreed. Equity requires as a
condition of specific performance a clear, mutual
understanding and a positive assent of both sides as
to the terms of the contract.' "
"In 36 Cyc. 543, in speaking of the essentials of
a contract which is enforceable in an action for specific performance, it is said: 'In general, the contract
must have the essentials of a contract valid and binding at law, in order to be enforceable in equity. It
must be a completed contract; there must have been
a clear, mutual understanding and a positive assent
on both sides as to the terms of the contract. It must
be sufficient, definite and certain. * * * '"
Practically the same rule is laid down by Mr. Justice
Straup in Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah, 86, 86 Pac. 768, for at page
772 of the Pacific Report he says:

"* * * In order to ingraft this exception onto the
statute of frauds, which requires that a conveyance
9
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of lands must be evidenced by a memorandum in
writing there should, in addition to the fact of pos
session and making of improvements, be clear and
conclusive proof of the contract, its scope and terms.
(bold face ours) The object of the statute of frauds
is to prevent the transfer of titles to lands 'on loos8
and indeterminate proofs of what ought to be established by solemn written contracts.' Taylor v. Ashley, 15 Tex. 50. In order to sustain a verbal contract
for the sale of land, of course, it is abs•olutely neeessary to prove the verbal contract either by direct or
circumstantial evidence; and this must be accompanied by proof of possession and strong equities· independent of the contract."
And a California case, Weisbrod v. Weisbrod, 81 P. 2d
633, 27 Cal. App. 2d 712, held: "Without mutuality, no specific performance of an asseted agreement can be decreed."
And in another Utah case, Ward v. Ward, 85 P. 2d, 635,
96 Utah 263, it was held:
"To entitle a party to specific performance of a
contract, the contract must in all respects be fair,
just and reasonable, and the compensations must be
mutual."
and
"To entitle a party to specific performance, the
contract must be attended with all the attributes of
fairness and honesty as will appeal to the conscience
of the chancellor, and the terms of the contract may
not be pieced out of oral testimony underlain and
contradictory in nature."
The situation that we have in the case at bar, before
the Court can consider whether the alleged contract is within
the statute of frauds or is taken out by part performance, is
then whether or not a contract actually existed. Did the
defendant agree to sell to the plaintiffs, and if so what were
the terms of the contracts?
Inasmuch as the first and second causes of action are
separate tranactions (R 18-19) testimony as to the alleged
10
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sale of the lands involved in the first cause of action should
be considered as was given by the plaintiff, William Christensen who testified that in the spring of 1942 the defendant
Emeron Christensen met him at his (the plaintiff's stack
yard and agreed to sell him the two tracts of land comprising 10 acres for $100.00 per acre, and that plaintiff could
pay defendant in livestock and services any way he wanted
to, without interest. There was no time set for any of the
payments. The plaintiff could pay just what he wanted any
time he wanted and for as long a time as he wanted. According to" plaintiff's testimony the contract could have gone on
forever, and the defendant would have had no action against
the plaintiff for non payment etc.
The testimony of plaintiff in court as to the time and
place of the making of the alleged contract was contradictory
to the· sworn answers of the plaintiff to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff on file in the· action. In his sworn
Answer to Interrogatory No. 1 the plaintiff said:
"The defendant Emeron Christensen offered to sell
the said 8.00acre tract of real property described in
Plaintiff's Complaint to the plaintiff * * *on numerous occasions during the spring, summer and fall of
the year 1942. * * * The said representations were
made on the said J.'leal property involved in this case
and at the home of the defendant Emeron Christensen at Elsinore, Utah. The plaintiff and the defenrdant and the wife of tbe plaintiff, Celesta Christensen, were present at the time said representations
were made." (bold face ours) (R A-15)
Plaintiff's answer to Iterrogatory No. 4 was:
"The negotiations for the sale and purchase of the
10.0 acre tract of property described in plaintiff's
complaint transpired over a p;eriod of several months
during the spring, summer and fall of the year 1942.
The plaintiff and the defendant were pres~ent at the
time said negotiations were completed and the oral
11
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agreement was reached for the sale and purchase of
said 10.0 acre tract of real property." (bold face
ours) (R A-16)
The plaintiff's testimony in Court was somewhat different. He testified that the defendant offered to sell only the
one time, at his (the plaintiff's stack yard) in the spring of
1942, and that only he and the defendant were present. (R
60 and 66)
The plaintiff introduced a number of pulp receipts tending to substantiate his claim that he hauled beet pulp for
the defendant during the fall of 1943 and spring of 1944.
Some were in the defendant Emeron Christensen's name and
some were in other names. The plaintiff claims he was not
paid for this labor by the defendant and that the same was
to apply on the purchase price of the property at the rate of
$1.50 per ton, but the receipts in themselves do not show a
credit by Emeron Christensen to the plaintiff, and there is
no memorandum in writing or other substantive evidence to
show that defendant ever agreed to pay defendant $1.50 per
ton for hauling beet pulp, or that he had any credit from
defendant for such purported services whatsoever.
The plaintiffs also introduced in evidence a certain account book in which the plaintiff, Celeste Christensen, had
noted certain livestock purportedly sold to defendant during
the years 1943 to 1944, for which plaintiffs claimed credits
en the purchase price of the land in question. These notations were made by plaintiff Celeste Christensen and there
was no notations by the defendants that same were to be
credited on any contract of sale. The defendant flatly denied
such were credits or that he received any livestock from
plaintiffs.
So here we have a situation of an oral contract claimed
12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to have been made with all of the terms and conditions thereof being alleged by the plaintiffs, all the credits on purchase
price being also alleged by plaintiffs, with not so much as
one receipt or the scratch of a pen to show the existence of
the contract by the defendants, or the credit or payment
thereon of services or livestock by the defendants'.
Defendant testified that during the years in question he
let the plaintiff, his brother, farm this ground because it
was situate where he didn't have other farming gl'lound and
let him use the ground if he would keep it up and pay the
taxes each year and he terminated such arrangement when
he bought adjoining property in 1955.
And as to plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, under an
Amended Complaint filed some seven months after the first
Complaint was made, wherein they allege they were to have
22¥2 shares of Sevier Valley Water stock under an exchange
agreement (also oral) entered into between the parties on
the same day (the spring of 1942), the defendants denied
plaintiffs were to have this water under any agreement ever
made but admitted there was an agreement for exchange of
lands and water which had been fully consummated. No
evidence to substantiate the alleged agreement of defendants
to give plaintiffs 221/2 shares of water in the Sevier Valley
Canal Company, was introduced, other than the plaintiffs'
testimony.
(b) If Contract on First Cause of Action Existed
Terms were too Uncertain to Entitle Spe·cific Performance.
Assuming that the plaintiffs' oral contract did exist,
did it meet the test of sufficiency to entitle it to be specific:.,
ally performed? We think not. Specific performance will
13
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not be decreed where the contract is incomplete, uncertain
or indefinite. z
If the plaintiffs are to be believed, the defendant Emeron Christensen agreed to sell the premises, but there was
no fixed amounts of payments or time for payment. The
plaintiff, William Christensen said he could pay in labor and
services at any time he wanted. (R 61) There was no specific place, terms or time of payment.
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 81, page 493; sets forth
the following on Time and Place of Payment or Performance:
" ( 1) In General. In order to warrant a decree of
specific performance thereof, a contract must be
reasonably definite and certain with respect to the
time, place and manner of payment or performance.
Specific enf.orcement of a contract may be precluded
by indefiniteness and uncertainty as to duration or
as to the time for performance or the time or terms
of payment. Likewise, the place of performance or
paym·ent must be stated with sufficient certainty or
definiteness or be capable of ascertainment from the
contract." (bold face ours)

******

(2) Failure to State Time. Where it is the intention of the parties to defer payment, but no provision
is made as to the time of payment, the uncertainty
is fatal; but mere failure to fix a time for payment
will not prevent specific performance where deferred
payment was not contemplated. Where payment by
the terms of the oontract is to be def,erred, but the
time of payment is not specified, the uncertainty is
fatal. Likewise, it is held in some, but not other jurisdictions that where a mortgage is to be given, a
failure to state when it shall mature or be payable

l

2 See Dodge Bros. v. Williams Estate Co. 52 Nev. 364, 287 P. 282,
283, wherein it was held: ''There is no better established principle
of equity jurisprudence than that specific performance will not be
decreed when the contract is incomplete, uncertain or indefinite."
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I

I
I

renders the contract so indefinite and uncertain as
to defeat specific performance. * * *"
(bold face
ours)
If a purported agreement is too indefinite to ascertain
the intention of the parties, it cannot be enforced; not for
want of an equitable remedy but because of the absence of
clear, unmistakable proof of all the essential Terms of a contract. See Buckmaster v. Bertram, 186 Cal. 673, 676, 200
P. 610. In this case a written contract was involved wherein
the plaintiff agreed to sell and convey to defendant, and defendant agreed to buy, five parcels of land in a certain tract
in a county for $1,000, payable "at the times and in the manner hereinafter mentioned, * * * to wit, in the form of a
mortgage payable to S. and due April3, 1919", and the court
held this contract too uncertain as to payment of the price
to be enforceable.
And the case of Mariposa Commercial & Mining Co. v.
Peters, et al, reported in 8 P. 2d, 849, decided by the Supreme
Court of the State of California, held "Agreement giving
option held incapable of specific performance where silent
on rate of interest and date of maturity of indebtedness."
And a Utah case, Olsen v. Gordon et al, reported in 125
P. 2d, 413, held "An oral contract for the purchase of real
property must be sufficiently definite and certain so that it
can be enforced by the court and a partial performance cannot make up f.or the deficiency in the understanding between
the parties."

It was held in the case of Edward H. Snow Development
Co. v. Oxsheer, 62 N.M. 113, 305 P. 2d, 727, that where binder agreement for the purchase of land provided that bal;;o.nce of price was to be paid as lots were released at the
convenience of the purchaser but no time was set for pay-
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ment of the balance, there was no presumption that a reasonable time was intended by the parties and the binder was
incapable of specific performance, and a court of equity will
not decree specific performance of a contract which does not
itself set a time for payment of a deferred balance. 3
(c)

If Contract on First Cause of Action Existed it

was Within the Statute of Frauds.
The law relating to the Statute of Frauds is set out in
25-5-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which provides:
"Leases and contracts for interest in lands.Every contract for the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized
in writing.''
The alleged contract in this action being one in parol, if
it exists, is obvious,ly under the statute of frauds and nonenforceable. The plaintiffs have sought to take the matter
out of the statute of frauds relying upon part performance
consisting of (1) alleged part payment and (2) the going
Into possession of the premises and (3) the making of permanent improvements thereon.
The credits plaintiffs claims on the purchase price were
as heretofore noted in the sum of $684.00 for services and
livestock as set forth by them, with a denial thereof by defendants, and no receipts from the defendants for such items
as credits on purchase price of the land involved. These
3 Quoting 81 C.J.S. No. 34, p. 493: "Where it is the intention of
the parties to defer payment but no provision is made as to the
time of payment, the uncertainty is fatal; but mere failure to fix a
time for payment will not prevent specific performance where deferred payment was not contemplated."
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claims for credit on purchase price are nothing more than
claims by the plaintiffs, denied by defendants, totally uncorroberated by any outside source, or by any written note
or memorandum by the defendants.
The going into possession of the premises was explained
by defendant Emeron Christensen. He let his brother go
into possession and farm the ground for keeping it up and
paying the taxes and he took the property back when such
arrangement was no longer tenable.
The case at bar does not involve actual possession and
permanent improvements in the usual sense. The leveling
plaintiff said he did was in conjunction with a County
project and benefitted plaintiff's 15 acre tract as well as the
10 acres in question. His fence repairs were trivial and his
work on a County road not contiguous to the property which
benefited his 15 acre tract and property of others was certainly not sufficient. Even if the evidence had been clear
and strong enough to impart life and validity to a contract
invalid because verbal, the essential requirements for invoking equity are absent.
The defendants contend these were only ordinary expenditures that were required if plaintiff farmed the land
and are requirements that are most often assumed and met
by a lessee when farm renting,· and especially in view .of the
fact that plaintiffs received the crops, rents and profits
from said land. The evidence is certainly not clear if they
benefited the ground in question to any great and substantial extent. The testimony of defendant was that the ground
had not been permanently· improved and that it still needs
to be leveled and the fences repaired.
If the improvements were in fact made by plaintiff, it
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should be brought to attention that such expenditures would
be far less than plaintiffs' income from the property during
the time he used same-fr-om 1942 to 1955, during all of
these years he received the benefit of the crops thereon, and
expended only the taxes thereon with such upkeep as would
be ordinarily necessary.
There are authorities to the effect that where the improvements do not exceed the rental value of the premises
they will not be regarded as of such a substantial value and
character as to constitute part performance so as to take the
case out of the statute of frauds. 4
In the case at. bar the defendant testified that a fair
rental for the property in question would be $40.00 an acre
(R 125) At this rate the rental value of the land for 14
years would far exceed any purported improvements made
upon the premises. As Justice Straup said in the case of
Price v. Lloyd 31 Utah, 86, 86 P. 767, at page 771 of the
Pacific Reporter:

"*** Here it is shown that the rental value of the

land far exceeded the improvements made upon the
premises. While such fact alone may not be the test
in determining the character and permanency of the
improvements, still it is a strong circumstance in
determining whether the purchaser or donee, who
made the improvements suffers a loss or injury, if
the oontract is not specifically performed. For, as
the authorities say, it must appear that the improvements relied upon as part performance are of a character permanently beneficial to the land and involving a sacrifice to him who made them because and
in reliance of the gift. If he had gained more by the
4 See Wooldridge v. Hancock, 70 Tex. 18 6 S.W. 818; Schoonmaker v. Plumer (Ill) 29 N.E. 1114; Buhler v. Trombly (Mich) 102
N.W. 647; Burns v. Daggett 141 Mass. 368, 6 N.E. 727; Poullain v.
Poullain, 76 Ga. 420, 4 S.E. 92; Porn. 'Spec. Per. Cont. 2nd Ed. No.
128, 129.
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possession and use of the land than he has lost by his
improvements, or if he has been in fact fully compensated for the improvements, they will not be available to him as ground for specific performance. Gallagher v. Gallagher (W. Va.) 5 S.E. 297; Browne, St.
Frauds No. 487-891."
In the case of Ravarino v. Price (Utah) 260 P. 2d 570 it
was held:
"Even if general improvements without possession
are sufficient to take oral contract to convey outside
statute of frauds, where possession is lacking court
must be convinced that no reasonable doubt exists as
to whether improvements are explainable on some
basis other than hypothesis of oral contract."
In 36 Cyc. 670 the rule is stated as follows:
"If improvements are relied upon, not merely as evidence that an actual possession was taken, but as an
additional, independent ground for specific performance, they must be both valuable and permanent.
Slight expenditures for repairs and the like, such as
might naturally be made by any person as incident
to an occupation of the premises, are insufficient."
And citing Johnston v. Baldock, 201 P. 654, 83 Okl. 285:
"Improvements relied on in connection with possession must be both valuable and permanent to take
an oral land sale contract out of the statute of
frauds."
And a Utah case:
"In action to quiet title to real property wherein defense was that defendant was in possession pursuant
to parol gift, evidence that defendant made expenditures upon real estate was not sufficient to take case
out of statute of frauds even had defendant definitely proven promise to give her the property, wh~ere
value of defendant's free use of the property exceeded amount allegedly spent for imp,rovem,ents." (bold
face ours) Moffat v. Hoffman, 61 U. 482, 214 P. 308.
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(d)

Second Cause of Action was Barred by Statute
of Limitations and Statute of Frauds.

Under Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action filed some
seven months after the First Cause of Action, they seek to
have 221j2 shares of Sevier Valley Canal Company water
stock transferred by defendants to them, under an alleged
oral contract made during the year 1942. Defendants admitted a certain transaction took place between the parties
whereby the plaintiffs conveyed to defendants 35 acres of
real property in Sevier County, Utah, with 171;-2 shares of
Elsinore Irrigation Canal Company water, in consideration
for which defendants conveyed to plaintiff Celeste Christensen, 15 acres of real property in Sevier County, Utah, and
further assumed and paid the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley some $2300.00 which the plaintiffs owed under a mortgage, the payment of which released their home and farm
and 11112 shares of water stock in the Sevier Valley Canal
Company. But defendants specifically denied they had ever
agreed to transfer 22¥2 shares of water in said Sevier Valley Canal Company as part of said exchange agreement.
Defendants contend the evidence was insufficient to
support such contention of plaintiffs and to prove the existence of the contract, and in their answer alleged the same
was barred by the statute of limitations. Section 78-12-25
(1) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads:
" ( 1) An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; ***
(etc.) pr10vided, that action in all of the foregoing
cases may be commenced at any time within four
years after the last charge is made or the last payment is received."
Plaintiffs' right of action accrued in 1942 when the exchange agreement was made and consummated as to all of
20
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the deeds and exchanges actually made between the parties. - Now they cannot come back some 14 years later and ask for
specific performance. The case of Whitehill v. Lowe, 10 U.
419, 427, 37 P. 589, applies 2 Comp. Laws 1888, which differs
little from the present section 78-12-25. Under this section
an action for specific performance of an alleged verbal contract to transfer certain shares of mining stock upon which
right of action accrued in 1884, was barred for not having
been commenced until 1892.
It is inconceivable that the defendant, Emeron Christen-~
sen would pay the water taxes upon this water (as his testi- .·
mony shows during the 14 years in question) if the water
belonged to plaintiffs and the plaintiffs had the right to,
the transfer of the same.

. POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REQUESTING AND RECEIVING FROM PLAINTIFFS'
COUNSEL, LETTERS AND STATEMENTS OF EVIDENCE AFTER THE TRIAL OF THIS ACTION WAS
CONCLUDED, AND OBJECTED TO BY COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANTS.
Defendants contend that it was highly irregular for the
Court to request and receive from the plaintiffs' counsel, the
letter of May 14, 1958 (R 173-4) in which valuations were
submitted by plaintiffs as to the land and water rights involved as well as inf.ormation pertaining to the Federal Land
Bank loan of plaintiffs, and the letter of May 23, 1958
(R 176) in which counsel for plaintiffs again submits valuations in response to the Court's request and in order to get
the matter determined and settled.
21
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The Court has by a certificate stated that such letters
were not taken into consideration in making a decision in
the action, but it is a matter of record that his Decision was
made on May 29, 1958, some six days after the letter of May
23, 1958, submitted by plaintiffs' counsel. And defendants
contend that such procedure by the Court was irregular and
prejudicial to the defendants in this action.
POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
Defendants assert that for all the reasons set forth
herein and above, the lower Court committed error in denying their Motion for a New Trial, and submit that said
Court, pursuant to Rule 59 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, should have made new Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment in Defendants' favor.
CONCLUSION
Defendants can conceive of no possible way the court
could have held for the plaintiffs in this action.
First, the existence of the agreements constituting the
oral contracts were never sufficiently proved.
Second, specific performance could not be granted, even
if proof of the contracts was sufficient, by reason of the
uncertainty, indefiniteness and ambiguity of the terms as
set forth by the plaintiffs.
Third, it does not appear that plaintiffs position is such
that an action at law for damages would not have afforded
them adequate relief.
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Fourth, the alleged oral contracts are clearly within the
statute of frauds and not enforceable if they exist at all.
There was no memorandum in writing or no part performance sufficiently proved to take the contracts out of the
statute, and plaintiffs have not suffered loss or damage having been full om ensated by the use of the propert from
42 to 1955 inclusive, having received the crops and inoome
therefrom during said years, and any payments allegedly
made by them for taxes and improvements during such years
would be far less than the income received, and would in fact
be less' than a fair rental value for the use of the premises.
Accordingly defendants assert the decision rendered by
the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

J. VERNON ERICKSON,
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants.
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